INAYAT YUSUF NADIADWALA,MUMBAI vs. NEW ITO WD 41(4)(2) OLD ITO WD 31(2)(1), BKC

Per : Narender Kumar Choudhry, Judicial Member:

This appeal has been preferred by the Assessee against the order dated 21.08.2023, impugned herein, passed by the National
Faceless Appeal Center (NFAC)/ Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax
(Appeals) (in short Ld. Commissioner) u/s 250 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (in short ‘the Act’) for the A.Y. 2014-15. 2. At the outset, it is noticed that there is delay of 750
days in filing the instant appeal, on which the Assessee has filed an application for condonation of delay and demonstrated the reasons qua condonation of delay which Mr. Inayat Yusuf Nadiawala

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are duly supported with duly sworn affidavit filed before us in support of its claim, which read as under: -
1. That the Appellate order of NFAC, Delhi for AY 2014-15 against
Appellate order u/s 250 was served to My CA on 21-08-2023. We were required to file the appeal before ITAT on or before 20-10-2023. However, there is a delay of 750 days. The delay was due to the fact that the email ID and cell number registered on the Income Tax Portal belonged to my earlier
CA who had subsequently resigned Consequently, the said email ID and cell number was not known to me and I was not made aware of the order passed thereunder. Hence the delay by me was not intentional. Thus the late filing was due to the reasons totally beyond my control. Looking at the above facts the necessary steps could not be taken, please take a lenient view and condone the delay. I came to know only when recovery started.
2. This delay is wholly unintentional & beyond the control of the appellant. The word 'Sufficient cause' has been construed quite liberally in case of R.J. Pratap Singh [100 ITR 698 S.C.]. S.N. Ghorpade [48 ITR 54
Mumbai].
3. The word 'Sufficient' cause is used in section 5 of the Limitation Act, hence equally important relevance is attached to it. The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase which is binding on all courts and Quasi-judicial authorities that decide condonation of delay on sufficient cause bein-g shown.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the court discretion to be exercised upon the principles which are well understood by the words sufficient cause', which receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or want of bonafide is imputable to the appellant. [Shankutala
Jain AIR 69 S.C.].
4. Recently in the case of Improvement Trust vs. Ujagar Singh (Supreme
Court) it was held that, "Justice can be done only when the matter is fought on merits and in accordance with law rather than to dispose it off on such technicalities and that too at the threshold; Unless malafide are writ large on the conduct of the party, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. In the legal arena, an attempt should always be made to allow the matter to be contested on merits rather than to throw it on such technicalities. Apart from the above, the appellant would not have gained in any manner whatsoever, by not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It is also worth noticing that delay was also not that huge, which could not have been condoned, without putting the respondents to harm or prejudice. It is the duty of the Court to see to it that justice should be done between the parties;"
5. In case of MST Katji [167 ITR 471 S.C.], the S.C. enunciated the following principles;
Mr. Inayat Yusuf Nadiawala

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Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
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Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold & cause of justice being defeated as against this, when the delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
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The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner.
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When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done, because of a non deliberate delay.
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There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of malafide. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
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It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

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Department under ‘other heads’ within 30 days of the date of this order.
5. Coming to the merits of the case, we observe that it appears from the assessment order that though the matter qua valuation of property involved, was referred to DVO, who conducted the valuation proceedings and thus the assessee filed the relevant documents in support its claim during remand proceedings, as demonstrated by the Assessee and not refuted by the Ld. DR, however, no report has been received from the DVO during the Assessment as well as 1st appellate proceedings and/or passing the assessment and impugned order.

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8. Thus, the case is accordingly remanded to the file of Ld. Commissioner for decision afresh, in the above terms.
9. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced in the open Court on 02.12.2025. (RENU JAUHRI) (NARENDER KUMAR CHOUDHRY)
ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER

* Kishore, Sr. P.S.

Copy to: The Appellant
The Respondent
The CIT, Concerned, Mumbai
The DR Concerned Bench

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By Order

Dy./Asstt.