THE DCIT ( INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ),, AHMEDABAD vs. BLACK PEARL SERVICES LIMITED, G.S.E.C. LTD., AHMEDABAD

PER WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:

The captioned appeals have been filed at the instance of the Revenue against the separate orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-13, Ahmedabad, of even dated 27/09/2017 arising in the matter of assessment order passed under s. 144C r.w.s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (here- in-after referred to as "the Act") relevant to Assessment Years 2011-12, 2012- 13 & 2013-14.

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4.1 Accordingly the assessee established its project office in India dated 15th May 2010 to implement the contract. Further, the Head Office purchased an oil rig machine worth Rs. 108.74 crores after borrowing the loan from the bank of Baroda-UAE branch. The HO office subsequently transferred the oil rig to the assessee in India to carry out the petroleum operations as discussed above.

4.2 As the oil rig was purchased out of the borrowed fund, a charge was created in the ROC Ahmedabad against such oil rig. The charge was created in India due to the fact that the oil rig was used in India. The bank of Baroda UAE branch created the charge after involving the branch of Bank of Baroda located at Ahmedabad.

4.3 The assessee during the year claimed interest expenses on loan borrowed by the head office for the purchase of the oil rig which was used in India amounting to Rs. 3,99,11,279/-only. The assessee further bifurcates the amount of impugned interest by debiting the profit and loss account and

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capitalizing the same amounting to Rs. 2,84,70,757/- and Rs. 1,14,40,522/- respectively. The assessee further claimed depreciation on the amount of interest capitalized in the year under consideration amounting to Rs. 17,16,078/-only.

4.4 The assessee during the assessment proceedings also claimed that the interest expenses were claimed as per prudent accounting policies and accounting standards issued by the ICAI.

4.5 The assessee further submitted that the interest expenses were directly attributable to the operations carried out in India and therefore the same was eligible for deduction as per explanation 3 of section 9 of the Act as well as article 7 of the DTAA between India and UAE. As such the assessee was eligible to claim the interest expenses under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act, as the loan was used for the purchase of the oil rig which was used exclusively in India for the business purpose in the year under consideration.

5.1 The TPO also noted that the assessee is eligible to claim the head office expenses not exceeding 5% of the adjusted total income or the expenses attributable to the operations carried out in India whichever is less under section 44C of the Act. As there was loss claimed by the assessee in its income tax return, then there is no question of claiming head office expenses.

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5.2 The TPO was of the view that the ALP on account of reimbursement of the cost for the interest was nil.

In view of the above, the AO disallowed the amount of interest debited to the profit and loss account for Rs. 2,84,70,757/- and the depreciation of Rs. 17,16,078/- attributable to the amount of interest capitalized in the year under consideration. Thus the AO added the sum of Rs. 3,01,86,835/- (2,84,70,757 + 17,16,078/-) to the total income of the assessee.

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• Income from the rig was offered to tax in India. Therefore the expenses incurred for interest is also attributable to the Indian operations as the rig in question has been deployed in India. • The income of the assessee (PE) was computed considering it as a separate and independent legal entity carrying out such business on its own. Thus impugned borrowing was used for the business in India. Accordingly, the impugned interest expense is allowable deduction u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act. • It is not the case where the HO of the assessee has charged interest at a rate higher than the rate charged by the bank. The assessee has proved that the reimbursement of interest expenses is based on back to back arrangement and interest expenditure is inextricably linked with the PE set up in India. Accordingly, in the light of the above discussion the Ld.CIT (A) deleted the addition made by the AO on account of Interest expenditure claimed by assessee in profit and loss account during the year.

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same is eligible for deduction under section 36(1)(iii)/ explanation 3 to section 9 of the Act and article 7 of the DTAA. The Ld. AR vehemently supported the order of the Ld.CIT (A).

11.1 From the preceding discussion we note certain undisputed facts as enumerated below: 1. The assessee has not transferred the cost of the oil rig purchased by the head office in the year under consideration. It is because the assessee has shown an outstanding amount payable to the head office for Rs. 1,12,14,40,855/- as evident from the balance sheet of the assessee which is placed on page 27 of the paper book.

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1[3. In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the business of the permanent establishment, including executive and general administrative expenses so incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere, in accordance with the provisions of and subject to the limitations of the tax laws of that State.]”

11.2 Similarly the relevant provisions as contained under section 9 of the Act stands as under: “The following incomes shall be deemed 65 to accrue or arise in India : [Explanation 2.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that “business connection” shall include any business activity carried out through a person who, acting on behalf of the non-resident,— (a) has and habitually exercises in India, an authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the non-resident, unless his activities are limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise for the non-resident; or (b) has no such authority, but habitually maintains in India a stock of goods or merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of the non-resident; or (c) habitually secures orders in India, mainly or wholly for the non-resident or for that non-resident and other non-residents controlling, controlled by, or subject to the same common control, as that non-resident: Provided that such business connection shall not include any business activity carried out through a broker, general commission agent or any other agent having an independent status, if such broker, general commission agent or any other agent having an independent status is acting in the ordinary course of his business : Provided further that where such broker, general commission agent or any other agent works mainly or wholly on behalf of a non-resident (hereafter in this proviso referred to as the principal non-resident) or on behalf of such non-resident and other non-residents which are controlled by the principal non-resident or have a controlling interest in the principal non-resident or are subject to the same common control as the principal non-resident, he shall not be deemed to be a broker, general commission agent or an agent of an independent status. Explanation 3.—Where a business is carried on in India through a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) of Explanation 2, only so much of income as is attributable to the operations carried out in India shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India;]”

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From the above provision, there remains no ambiguity that the claim of the assessee was as per the provisions of law and accordingly allowable as deduction.

11.3 We further note that the provisions of section 44C relate to the head office expenses which are of administrative nature. The relevant provisions of section are reproduced as under: “44C. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 28 to 43A, in the case of an assessee, being a non-resident, no allowance shall be made, in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”, in respect of so much of the expenditure in the nature of head office expenditure as is in excess of the amount computed as hereunder, namely:— (a) an amount equal to five per cent of the adjusted total income; or (b) 24[***] (c) the amount of so much of the expenditure in the nature of head office expenditure incurred by the assessee as is attributable to the business or profession of the assessee in India 25, (iv) “head office expenditure” means executive and general administration expenditure incurred by the assessee outside India, including expenditure incurred in respect of— (a) rent, rates, taxes, repairs or insurance of any premises outside India used for the purposes of the business or profession; (b) salary, wages, annuity, pension, fees, bonus, commission, gra-tuity, perquisites or profits in lieu of or in addition to salary, whether paid or allowed to any employee or other person employed in, or managing the affairs of, any office outside India; (c) travelling by any employee or other person employed in, or managing the affairs of, any office outside India; and (d) such other matters connected with executive and general administration as may be prescribed.]”

The above provision restricts the administrative expenses incurred at the head office to be attributed to Indian operation. As such it doesn’t restrict the expenses incurred by the assessee which are directly attributable to the

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operations in India. Therefore in our considered view, there cannot be any restriction on the claim of the assessee regarding the impugned interest expense.

11.4 As we have already held that, there was no element of income in the amount of interest reimbursed by the assessee to the head office; therefore the question of applying the adjustment under section 92C(3) of the Act treating the same as the international transaction does not apply. Thus in the given facts and circumstances, we are of the view that there was no need to carry out any transfer pricing study/benchmarking the transaction of interest. Hence we hold that there cannot be any adjustment on account of transfer pricing.

11.5 Regarding the allegation of the Revenue that there was no evidence to prove that the same oil rig was used in India in respect of which the assessee has claimed expenses, we note that the Revenue has allowed the depreciation on such oil rig. But at the same time, the Revenue is apprehending whether the same oil rig was used in respect of which the loan was obtained. However, the allegation of the Revenue is based on its surmise and conjecture without referring to any tangible materials in support of its contention. The assessee has offered the income in its financial statements from the oil rig which has not been disputed. Therefore it can be safely inferred that the expenses incurred by the assessee are in respect of the same oil rig in the absence of any contrary evidence. Thus we are of the view the allegation of the Revenue does not have any substance and accordingly, we reject the same.

11.6 Regarding the allegation of the Revenue that the assessee has reimbursed the entire cost of the oil rig amounting to Rs. 108.74 crores, we find that the assessee in its balance sheet placed on page 23 to 38 of the paper

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book has shown an amount payable to its head office for Rs. 1,12,14,40,855/-. This fact evidences that the assessee has not reimbursed the cost of the oil rig in the year under consideration. Moreover the Ld. DR before us has not brought anything on record contrary to the finding of the ld. CIT (A). Hence we concur with the view of the ld. CIT-A. Thus the ground of appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.

13.1 The assessee in compliance of such notice submitted that the PMC machinery bearing PAN No AADCP5841L has paid tax on such income. According to the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, the assessee should not be treated as assessee in default in the present case on account NON deduction of TDS.

13.2 However the AO rejected the contention of the assessee by observing that second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was introduced by Finance Act 2012 w.e.f, 01-04-2013. Therefore it is not applicable for the year under consideration.

13.3 Without prejudice to the above, the AO also observed that to avail the benefit of above proviso the assessee requires to fulfill the conditions as

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prescribed in proviso 1 to section 201 of the Act. As such the assessee is required to furnish a certificate from an accountant in such form (form 26A) as prescribed in rule 31ACB of the Income Tax Rules.

13.4 As the assessee failed to furnish the form 26A, therefore, the same was disallowed and added to the total income of the assessee.

14.1 The assessee further relied on the order of Allahabad bank Vs. ITO reported in 152 ITD 383 wherein ITAT held that if the payer makes available PAN to the AO, the onus lies on the department first to examine whether such payee has paid tax on such income in its return. After that, the Revenue may proceed against the assessee.

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18.1 We also find that the assessee once furnishes the PAN of the recipient, then the onus shifts to the AO to verify whether the payee has paid the tax on the same irrespective of the Act whether the assessee files form 26A as discussed above. In this regard, we find support and guidance from the judgment of Hon’ble Agra ITAT in case of Allahabad bank Vs. ITO reported in 152 ITD 383 wherein it was held as under: “The lapse on account of non-deduction of tax at source is to be visited with three different consequences - penal provisions, interest provisions and recovery provisions. The penal provisions in respect of such a lapse are set out in section 271C. So far as penal provisions are concerned, the penalty is for lapse on the part of the assessee and it has nothing to do with whether or not the taxes were ultimately recovered through other means. The provisions regarding interest in delay in depositing the taxes are set out in section 201(1A). These provisions provide that for any delay in recovery of such taxes revenue is to be compensated by the levy of interest. As far as recovery provisions are concerned, these provisions are set out in section 201(1) which seeks to make good any loss to revenue on account of lapse by the assessee tax deductor. However, the question of making good the loss of revenue arises only when there is indeed a loss of revenue and the loss of revenue can be there only when recipient had a liability to pay the tax and he has not paid tax. Therefore recovery provisions under section 201(1) can be invoked only when loss to revenue is established, and that can only be established, when it is demonstrated that the recipient of income has not paid due taxes thereof and the recipient of the amounts had the liability to tax. In the absence of the statutory powers to requisition any information from the

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recipient of income, the assessee is indeed not always able to obtain the same. The provisions to make good the shortfall in collection of taxes may, thus, end up being invoked even when there is no shortfall in fact. On the other hand, once assessee furnishes the requisite basic information, the Assessing Officer can very well ascertain the related facts about payment of taxes on income of the recipient directly from the recipients of income. It is not the revenue's case that on the facts of this case, such an exercise by the Assessing Officer is not possible. It does put an additional burden on the Assessing Officer before he can invoke section 201(1) and that's how the High Court has visualized the scheme of the Act and that's how, therefore, it meets the ends of justice”

In view of the above, we do not find any reason to interfere in the order of the Ld.CIT (A). Hence we uphold the order of the Ld.CIT (A). Thus the ground of appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.

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to demonstrate that the same Rig on which loan has been taken by the Head Office in the Indian operations. 5. Therefore the order of the Ld. CIT(A) deserves to be deleted and that the order of Assessing Officer be restored.

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24.1 However the assessee in the year under consideration has offered the income under presumption basis as specified under section 44BB(1) of the Act at the rate of 10% of the gross receipts which was deemed as income of the assessee chargeable to tax. The assessee further claimed the set off of the brought forward loss against the current income.

24.2 The assessee further contended that there is no denial under the provisions of section 44BB of the Act to set off the brought forward loss against the income computed on presumption basis.

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24.3 The assessee also submitted that it could change its stand for computing the income by books of accounts to presumption basis. Accordingly, it is entitled to set off the brought forward losses against the income offered on presumption basis.

26.1 The assessee also submitted that there is no estoppel under the provision of section 44BB to change the method of computing the income by books of accounts to presumption basis and vice versa. The assessee also submitted that the income for each year is determined separately without

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making any reference to the basis of the income determined in the earlier year.

29.1 The Ld. AR also submitted that the assessee cannot claim the benefit for the deduction specified under section 28 to 41 and sections 43 and 43A of the Act when it files the return of income under the provisions of section 44BB of the Act on presumption basis. But it is nowhere prohibited to claim the deduction on account of brought forward losses.

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29.2 The learned AR before us also submitted that the AO also made the similar disallowance in the assessment AR 2014-15 which was deleted by the learned CIT (A) in his order wide order dated 27-9-2017. However, the Revenue has not preferred any appeal against such order of the learned CIT (A). Thus there remains no doubt that the order of the learned CIT (A) has reached its finality in the assessment year 2014-15. Therefore there cannot be any question of denying the set off of the brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation for the year under consideration. The Ld. AR before us vehemently supported the order of the Ld.CIT (A).

30.1 The assessee has set off the brought forward unabsorbed depreciation amounting to ₹ 87,24,730.00 against the income computed on presumption basis under section 44BB(1) of the Act in the year under consideration.

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30.2 Similarly, the assessee has set off the brought forward unabsorbed depreciation amounting to ₹ 8,36,774.00 against the income computed on presumption basis in the AY 2014-15.

30.3 However, the AO rejected the claim of the assessee for both the assessment years for the set off of the unabsorbed depreciation against the income determined on presumption basis for both the AYs, i.e., 2013-14 & 2014-15.

30.4 We further note that the learned CIT (A) allowed the set off of the unabsorbed depreciation brought forward from the earlier years for both the assessment years, i.e., 2013-14 and 2014-15 against the income computed on presumption basis under section 44BB(1) of the Act by passing a combined order dated 27-09-2017.

30.5 But the Revenue has preferred an appeal before the ITAT in respect of the assessment year 2013-14, and there was no appeal preferred by the Revenue against the order of the ld. CIT-A for the AY 2014-15. As such the order of the learned CIT (A) for the assessment year, 2014-15 has reached to its finality as there was no appeal filed by the Revenue. The reasons for not filing the appeal by the Revenue are best known to the Revenue only.

30.6 It is also important to note that the case of Revenue for the assessment year 2014-15 was also not hit by the relevant circular bearing No. 21 of 2015 issued by CBDT dated 10-12-2015 due to low tax effect as the ld. CIT-A passed a combined order. Therefore it cannot be hit by the CBDT Circular. The relevant extract of the circular is also expected below:

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“However, in case of a composite order of any High Court or appellate authority, which involves more than one assessment year and common issues in more than one assessment year, appeal shall be filed in respect of all such assessment years even if the 'tax effect' is less than the prescribed monetary limits in any of the year(s), if it is decided to file appeal in respect of the year(s) in which 'tax effect' exceeds the monetary limit prescribed.”

From the above, it is clear that the case of the assessee about the assessment 201 4-15 was not subject to the provisions of the circular issued by the CBDT as discussed above on the reasoning of low tax effect in the said AY. Rather the Revenue was required by the circular to prefer the appeal before the ITAT for the AY 2014-15 as the Revenue filed the appeal for the AY 2013-14 against the combined order of CIT-A.

30.7 On a specific question from the bench to the learned DR to clarify whether the Revenue has preferred any appeal against the order of learned CIT-A pertaining to the assessment year 2014-15, the ld. DR did not advance any argument contrary to the fact as discussed above i.e. non-filing the appeal before the ITAT.

30.8 From the preceding discussion, there remains no doubt that the order of the learned CIT-A for the assessment 2014-15 has reached its finality wherein the loss was allowed to be set off. It is a divulge fact that there is no change in the facts & circumstances in the case of the assessee pertaining to the AY 2013-14 & 2014-15.

30.9 Admittedly, the Revenue in one year ( AY 2013-14) has disputed the set off of the unabsorbed depreciation against the income and in another year (AY 2014-15) the set off of the unabsorbed depreciation against the income was accepted in the identical facts & circumstances. In such a situation where

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the Revenue has accepted the stand of the assessee in one year, then in the identical facts, the stand of the assessee in another year cannot be challenged. In holding so, we find support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr vs. Union Of India & Ors in Writ Petition (civil) 183 of 2003 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/03/2006 wherein it was observed as under:

“136. In Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd., Vs. Janapada Sabha (1963) Supp.1 SCR 172 (referred to hereafter as Amalgamated Coalfields No.(2)), the issue was whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to writ petitions filed under Article 226 or to petitions under Article 32. The Court noted that the judicial view was that even petitions filed under Article 32 were subject to the general principle of res judicata. The Court then considered whether the principle would apply to tax cases when the earlier decision was in respect of a different period and said:- "In a sense, the liability to pay tax from year to year is a separate and distinct liability; it is based on a different cause of action from year to year, and if any points of fact or law are considered in determining the liability for a given year, they can generally be deemed to have been considered and decided in a collateral and incidental way." After considering various earlier authorities on the issue, it was held that:- "If for instance, the validity of a taxing statute is impeached by an assessee who is called upon to pay a tax for a particular year and the matter is taken to the High Court or brought before this Court and it is held that the taxing statute is valid, it may not be easy to hold that the decision on this basic and material issue would not operate as res judicata against the assessee for a subsequent year. That, however, is a matter on which it is unnecessary for us to pronounce a definite opinion in the present case. In this connection, it would be relevant to add that even if a direct decision of this Court on a point of law does not operate as res judicata in a dispute for a subsequent year, such a decision would, under Art. 141, have a binding effect not only on the parties to it, but also on all courts in India as a precedent in which the law is declared by this Court. The question about the applicability of res judicata to such a decision would thus be a matter of merely academic significance". (Emphasis ours) After refraining from expressing any final opinion on the applicability of res judicata to assessment orders for successive years, the Court was quite unequivocal in expressing an opinion on the applicability of the principles of constructive res judicata.

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"In our opinion, constructive res judicata which is a special and artificial form of res judicata enacted by S. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code should not generally be applied to writ petitions filed under Art.32 or Art.226. We would be reluctant to apply this principle to the present appeals all the more because we are dealing with cases where the impugned tax liability is for different years". It was held that in any event: ".the appellants cannot be precluded from raising the new contentions on which their challenge against the validity of the notices is based". The question in M/s. Radhasoami Satsang Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 1992(1) SCC 659 (also cited by the State of U.P.) was whether the Tribunal was bound by an earlier decision in respect of an earlier assessment year that the income derived by the Radhasoami Satsang, a religious institution, was entitled to exemption under Sections 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court said:- " We are aware of the fact that strictly speaking res judicata does not apply to income tax proceedings. Again, each assessment year being a unit, what is decided in one year may not apply in the following year but where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year, unless there was any material change justifying the Revenue to take a different view of the matter". Amalgamated Coalfields case No.2 (supra) was distinguished in the case of Devi Lal Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer 1965 (1) SCR 86 in which the challenge was to assessment proceedings under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. The special leave petition was also dismissed. The same order of assessment was challenged by filing a second writ petition before the High Court. This was also dismissed by the High Court. The question, before this Court was whether it was open to the appellant to challenge the validity of the same order of assessment twice by two consecutive writ petitions under Article 226. The Court acknowledged that in regard to the orders of assessment for different years, the position may be different and said:- "Even if the said orders are passed under the same provisions of law, it may theoretically be open to the party to contend that the liability being recurring from year to year, the cause of action is not the same; and so, even if a citizen's petition challenging the order of assessment passed against him for

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one year is rejected, it may be open to him to challenge a similar assessment order passed for the next year. In that case, the court may ultimately adopt the same view which had been adopted on the earlier occasion; but if a new ground is urged, the court may have to consider it on the merits, because, strictly speaking the principle of res judicata may not apply to such a case. That, in fact, is the effect of the decision of this Court in the Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and Anr. V. The Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara (1963) Supp.1 SCR.172..In our opinion, the said general observations must be read in the light of the important fact that the order which was challenged in the second writ petition was in relation to a different period and not for the same period as was covered by the earlier petition." But as far as a challenge to the same assessment order is concerned, it was held:- "that if constructive res judicata is not applied to such proceedings a party can file as many writ petitions as he likes and take one or two points every time. That clearly is opposed to considerations of public policy on which res judicata is based and would mean harassment and hardship to the opponent. Besides, if such a course is allowed to be adopted, the doctrine of finality of judgments pronounced by this Court would also be materially affected. We are, therefore, satisfied that the second writ petition filed by the appellant in the present case is barred by constructive res judicata". 30.10 We also place our reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Muthoot M. George Bankers reported in 159 taxman 22 wherein it was held as under: “7. This Court has time and again taken the view that there must be some consistency in the stand of the revenue and they cannot pick and choose cases in which to file an appeal in respect of some assessee and not to file an appeal in respect of identical orders in respect of another assessee. This view has also been expressed by the Supreme Court on several occasions and despite that we find that the revenue insists upon taking such arbitrary decisions for which there is no iota of justification. If the revenue puts forward some reason for its differential treatment, that will, of course, be considered on merits but in this particular case there is no such reason except to say there is no res judicata or estoppel. The rule of consistency must be followed by the revenue, which they have failed to do in this particular case.” 30.11 We also place our reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Forest Development Corporation of Mah. Ltd reported in 84 taxmann.com 294 wherein it was held as under: “10. In the present case, no distinction in facts or law has been shown to us in the earlier order of the Tribunal dt.22.8.2006 for the Assessment Year 2003-04 and the

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impugned order. Nor any submission has been made before us to show why the reasons found in the order dt.22.8.2006 which are incorporated in the impugned order are not sustainable in law. This would have to be shown as the impugned order merely relies upon the order dt.22.8.2006 of the Tribunal for the Assessment Year 2003-04. In fact, the Revenue has even not annexed the copy of the order dt.22.8.2006 for the Assessment Year 2003-04 of the Tribunal to the appeal memo. 11. In the above view, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal. Thus, we hold that, in the peculiar facts of this case, no substantial question arises for our consideration.” 30.12 Therefore in our considered view the appeal filed by the Revenue pertaining to the assessment year 2013-14 is not sustainable on the ground that in the identical facts and circumstances the order of the learned CIT-A has reached to its finality wherein the issue was decided in favor of the assessee.

30.13 Thus we hold that the assessee on this technical count only succeeds in the appeal filed before us. As we have decided the issue in favor of the assessee on the basis of technical count as discussed above, we are not inclined to adjudicate the issue on merit. Hence we do not find any reason to disturb the finding of the learned CIT-A. Thus the ground of appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.

Order pronounced in the Court on 27/03/2019 at Ahmedabad.

-Sd- -Sd- (Ms. MADHUMITA ROY) (WASEEM AHMED) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER (True Copy) Ahmedabad; Dated 27/03/2019 Manish

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आदेश क� ��त�ल�प �े�षत/Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथ� / The Appellant 2. ��यथ� / The Respondent. 3. संबं�धत आयकर आयु�त / Concerned CIT 4. आयकर आयु�त(अपील) / The CIT 5. �वभागीय ��त�न�ध, आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण / DR, ITAT, 6. गाड� फाईल / Guard file. आदेशानुसार/BY ORDER, उप/सहायक पंजीकार (Dy./Asstt.Registrar) आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, अहमदाबाद / ITAT, Ahmedabad