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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, JAIPUR BENCH ’B’, JAIPUR
Before: SHRI RAMESH C. SHARMA, AM & SHRI VIJAY PAL RAO, JM
PER VIJAY PAL RAO, JM : This appeal by the assessee is directed against the order dated 20th
November, 2018 of ld. CIT (A), Ajmer for the assessment year 2005-06. The
assessee has raised the following grounds :-
“ 1. The ld. CIT (A) has erred on facts and in law in upholding the validity of the order passed by AO u/s 147 of the IT Act, 1961.
The ld. CIT (A) has erred on facts and in law in confirming the addition of Rs. 26.52 crores on account of accrued interest on deferred subvention receivable from State Government by holding that since there is no change in the facts as compared to the facts of earlier AYs, there cannot be any justification for accounting the interest on cash basis during the year as against accrual basis in the earlier years.
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The assessee craves to amend, alter and modify any of the grounds of appeal.
The appropriate cost be awarded to the assessee.
Ground No. 1 is regarding validity of reopening of the assessment
under section 147/148 of the IT Act.
The assessee is a State Government Undertaking and engaged in generation
of power. The assessee filed its return of income for the year under consideration on
29.10.2005 declaring total income at NIL. Scrutiny assessment under section 143(3)
was completed on 14.06.2007 by making various additions to the tune of Rs.
121,85,97,423/- though the total income was assessed at NIL after setting off of
brought forward unabsorbed depreciation to the extent of available income.
Subsequently the AO noted that during the previous year relevant to assessment
year under consideration the assessee was following mercantile system of
accounting and from the current year the method of accounting on deferred
subvention receivable from Government of Rajasthan was changed from accrual
basis to cash basis. This change of method of account on a particular item of
income has resulted understatement of income of Rs. 24.59 crores. Accordingly, the
AO proposed to reopen the assessment by issuing a notice under section 148 in the
month of March, 2012. The assessee objected to the addition proposed by the AO
on account of interest on deferred subvention receivable from State Government as
well as challenged the validity of notice under section 148 of the IT Act on the
ground that the AO has reopened the assessment on the basis of information
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already available on record. The AO did not accept the contention of the assessee
and made an addition of Rs. 26.52 crores on account of interest on subvention
receivable from Government of Rajasthan. The assessee challenged the action of
the AO before the ld. CIT (A) but could not succeed.
Before us, the ld. A/R of the assessee has submitted that the original
assessment was completed on 14.06.2007 under section 143(3) and the reopening
of the assessment is after 4 years from the end of the assessment year under
consideration, therefore, when there is no failure on the part of the assessee to
disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment, the reopening is
bad in law as barred by limitation as per the provision to section 147 of the IT Act.
The ld. A/R has pointed out that the AO in the reasons recorded has mentioned that
on perusal of the record and particularly from the audit report he noticed that the
assessee has changed the method of accounting in respect of interest on deferred
subvention receivable from State Government. This fact itself shows that the entire
facts and record was available with the AO at the time of original assessment order
passed under section 143(3) and, therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee has
failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment. From
the above provisions it can be noted that assessment u/s 147 in respect of original
assessment completed u/s 143(3) can be reopened after 4 years only when there is
failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. In the
present case, the AO has reopened the assessment on the basis of change in
accounting policy. It is submitted that while filing return of income assessee has
disclosed all the material facts fully and truly. The facts relating to change in
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aforesaid accounting policy has been specifically mentioned in para 5 of Schedule 28
– Notes on Accounts as under :-
“ During the year change has been made in the policy regarding accounting of the interest on the deferred subvention receivable from State Government. Previously the same was being accounted for accrual basis and interest @ 5% was accounted for, but from now onwards interest is being accounted for on actual cash basis due to this change, other income of the current year is lower by Rs. 24.59 crores.”
Further in para 11(b) & (c) to Form No. 3CD of tax audit report which deals with
method of accounting, change in accounting policies and effect of change, it has
been specifically mentioned that the company has changed the method of
accounting of interest income on deferred subvention receivable from the
Government of Rajasthan from accrual to cash basis. It has also been mentioned
that due to aforesaid change, the income of the year is understated by Rs. 24.59
crores. The ld. A/R has also submitted that Statutory Auditors has also mentioned in
its audit report in para 13(a)(iii) of Annexure II to audit report that interest on
deferred subvention receivable from State Government has been accounted on
receipt basis. Thus, facts relating to change in accounting policy vis a vis effect of
change in accounting policy has been fully and truly disclosed by the assessee. The
AO in the order passed u/s 143(3) has stated that assessee has filed its return
declaring total income of Rs. Nil and audit report u/s 44AB was accompanied with
the return. Hence, reopening of assessment proceeding is nothing but change of
opinion which is outside the scope of provision of section 147. In support of his
contention, he has relied upon the following decisions :-
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DCIT vs. Aristocrat Luggage Ltd. 46 CCH 254 (Mumbai Trib.)
PCIT vs. Tupperware India Pvt. Ltd. 127 DTR 161 (Del. HC)
CIT vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 143 DTR 79 (Raj. HC)
On the other hand, the ld. D/R has relied upon the orders of the authorities
below and submitted that the assessee has changed the method of accounting for
recognizing the income of a particular head being Interest on deferred subvention
receivable from State Government. The said change of method of accounting is
solely for avoiding the tax liability by deferring the income. The AO has got specific
information that the assessee has not offered to tax the interest accrued of Rs.
26.52 crores, therefore, it constitute a tangible material to form the belief that
income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.
We have considered the rival submissions as well as the relevant material on
record. There is no dispute that the original assessment was completed on
14.06.2007 under section 143(3) whereby the AO made various additions to the
tune of Rs. 121,85,97,423/-. Subsequently the AO reopened the assessment by
recording the reasons as under :-
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On plain reading of the reasons recorded by the AO, it reveals that after completion
of the assessment under section 143(3), the AO noticed from the audit report in
Form 3CD that the assessee is otherwise following mercantile basis of accounting
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but for the year under consideration, the assessee has changed the method of
accounting in respect of deferred subvention receivable from Government of
Rajasthan. Thus the AO was of the view that this change of method of accounting
not recognizing the interest on deferred subvention receivable from State
Government has resulted understatement of income of Rs. 24.59 crores. This
information has been taken by the AO from the record and facts already available
with the AO at the time of assessment completed under section 143(3). We further
note that apart from the audit report, this fact was also revealed by the assessee as
per Note on accounts item no. 16 of Schedule-28 of Annual Report. This fact is also
recorded by the AO in the reasons recorded. Thus the entire information which is
gathered by the AO for formation of the belief that income assessable to tax has
escaped assessment was available on the assessment record. Though the change of
method of accounting for a particular item of income from accrual to cash basis and
not taking a consistent policy decision in respect of the corresponding expenditure
towards interest payable to Government of Rajasthan may be a serious divergent
from the consistent accounting policy, however, when all these facts and material
were already available with the AO at the time of scrutiny assessment, then not
taking up the scrutiny on this point and conducting any enquiry on this issue would
have rendered the assessment order passed under section 143(3) as erroneous so
far as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and, therefore, the remedy with the
revenue was under section 263 of the IT Act. It is not open to the AO to review its
own decision by re-analyzing and evaluating the same material after completing the
assessment under section 143(3). This would amount to change of opinion or
reviewing its own decision. Even otherwise, if the AO has failed to conduct an
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enquiry in respect of a particular issue, it will be a lapse and defect in the said order
and subsequently the AO is not permitted to make up the said deficiency by
resorting to the provisions of section 147/148 of the IT Act. Therefore, once the
relevant facts were available before the AO at the time of scrutiny assessment, then
on the basis of the same facts the AO cannot take a different stand under the
provisions of section 147/148 of the IT Act. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of
PCIT vs. Tupperware India Pvt. Ltd. 236 Taxman 494 (Delhi) has considered this
issue of reopening of the assessment on the basis of the material already available
with the AO and held in para 12 to 21 as under :-
“12. At the outset it requires to be factually noticed that the reopening order of the AO only refers to the report of Statutory Auditor under Section 44AB of the Act which report was already enclosed with the return filed by the Assessee. Therefore, factually, there was no new material that the AO came across so as to have ‘reasons to believe that the income had escaped assessment’.
As far as the legal requirement is concerned, the Court finds that the decision in CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd. (supra) answers the question squarely in favour of the Assessee in the facts of the present case. In Orient Craft Ltd. this Court considered the decisions of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Kelvinator India Ltd. (2010) 320 ITR 561 and Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (supra).
The question examined by the Court in CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd. (supra) is identical to the one sought to be projected by the Revenue in this appeal viz., whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that in the absence of any tangible material available with the AO to form the requisite belief regarding escapement of income, the reopening (under Section 147/148) of the assessment made under Section 143 (1) was bad in law?
In CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd. (supra) the Revenue sought to argue, placing reliance on Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (supra) that “intimation” could not be equated with “assessment”. The Court observed that the decision in Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (supra) “contrary to what the Revenue would have us believe, does not give a carte blanche to the Assessing Officer to disturb the finality of the intimation under Section 143 (1) at his whims and caprice; he must have reason to believe within the meaning of the Section.” The Court in Orient Craft Ltd. recorded
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that the decision in Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. underscored that the intimation under Section 143 (1) of the Act could be disturbed by initiating reassessment proceedings only:
“so long as the ingredients of Section 147 are fulfilled and with reference to Section 143(1) vis-a-vis Section 147, the only ingredient is that there should be reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and it does not matter that there has been no failure or omission on the part of the assessee to disclose full and true particulars at the time of the original assessment. There is nothing in the language of Section 147 to unshackle the Assessing Officer from the need to show “reason to believe”. The fact that the intimation issued under Section 143(1) cannot be equated to an “assessment”, a position which has been elaborated by the Supreme Court in the judgment cited above, cannot in our opinion lead to the conclusion that the requirements of Section 147 can be dispensed with when the finality of an intimation under Section 143(1) is sought to be disturbed.”
The Court in CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd. (supra) examined the meaning given of the words ‘reasons to believe’, quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Kelvinator India Ltd. and held as under:
“Having regard to the judicial interpretation placed upon the expression “reason to believe”, and the continued use of that expression right from 1948 till date, we have to understand the meaning of the expression in exactly the same manner in which it has been understood by the courts. The assumption of the Revenue that somehow the words “reason to believe” have to be understood in a liberal manner where the finality of an intimation under Section 143(1) is sought to be disturbed is erroneous and misconceived. As pointed out earlier, there is no warrant for such an assumption because of the language employed in Section 147; it makes no distinction between an order passed under section 143(3) and the intimation issued under section 143(1). Therefore it is not permissible to adopt different standards while interpreting the words “reason to believe” vis-a-vis Section 143(1) and Section 143(3). We are unable to appreciate what permits the Revenue to assume that somehow the same rigorous standards which are applicable in the interpretation of the expression when it is applied to the reopening of an assessment earlier made under Section 143(3) cannot apply where only an intimation was issued earlier under Section 143(1). It would in effect place an assessee in whose case the return was processed under Section 143(1) in a more vulnerable position than an assessee in whose case there was a full-fledged scrutiny assessment made under Section 143(3). Whether the return is put to scrutiny or is accepted without demur is not a matter which is within the control of assessee; he has no choice in the matter. The other consequence, which is somewhat graver, would be that the entire rigorous procedure involved in reopening an assessment and the burden of proving valid reasons to believe could be circumvented by first accepting the return under Section 143(1) and thereafter issue notices to reopen the assessment. An interpretation which makes a distinction between the meaning and content of the expression “reason to believe” in cases where assessments were framed earlier under Section 143(3) and cases where mere intimations were issued earlier
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under Section 143(1) may well lead to such an unintended mischief. It would be discriminatory too. An interpretation that leads to absurd results or mischief is to be eschewed.”
The Court in CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd. (supra) further comprehensively rejected the argument of the Revenue, which it seeks to urge in the present case as well, that an 'intimation' under Section 143 (1) cannot be equated to an assessment. The Court held:
“The argument of the revenue that an intimation cannot be equated to an assessment, relying upon certain observations of the Supreme Court in Rajesh Jhaveri (supra) would also appear to be self-defeating, because if an “intimation” is not an “assessment” then it can never be subjected to Section 147 proceedings, for, that section covers only an “assessment” and we wonder if the revenue would be prepared to concede that position. It is nobody’s case that an “intimation” cannot be subjected to Section 147 proceedings; all that is contended by the assessee, and quite rightly, is that if the revenue wants to invoke Section 147 it should play by the rules of that section and cannot bog down. In other words, the expression “reason to believe” cannot have two different standards or sets of meaning, one applicable where the assessment was earlier made under Section 143(3) and another applicable where an intimation was earlier issued under Section 143(1). It follows that it is open to the assessee to contend that notwithstanding that the argument of “change of opinion” is not available to him, it would still be open to him to contest the reopening on the ground that there was either no reason to believe or that the alleged reason to believe is not relevant for the formation of the belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In doing so, it is further open to the assessee to challenge the reasons recorded under Section 148(2) on the ground that they do not meet the standards set in the various judicial pronouncements.”
It may be noticed at this stage that the decision in Orient Craft Ltd has been followed by this Court in Madhukar Khosla v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2013) 354ITR 356.
There is no ground urged in the present appeal by the Revenue that the decision in CIT v. Orient Craft Ltd. was erroneously decided and requires reconsideration. During the course of arguments it was submitted that having regard to the decision of the Full Bench in CIT-VI v. Usha International Ltd. (2012) 348 ITR 485, the question should be re- examined by the Court.
In the first place, it requires to be noted that the decision in Orient Craft Ltd. was delivered after the decision of the Full Bench in Usha International Ltd. (supra). Secondly, the subsequent decision in Madhukar Khosla noted the decision in Usha International Ltd. and reiterated the dictum in Orient Craft Ltd. Again in a decision dated 28th January 2015 in Mohan Gupta (HUF) v. Commissioner of Income Tax-XI (2014) 366ITR 115 (Del) the Court reiterated the decision in Orient Craft Ltd. Thirdly, the Court finds that the questions framed for consideration by the Full Bench in Usha International Ltd. as set out in para 1 of the said judgment did not
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pertain to reopening of an assessment under Section 143 (1) of the Act. The four questions referred to the Full Bench were as under:
“(i) What is meant by the term "change of opinion"?
(ii) Whether assessment proceedings can be validly reopened under Section 147 of the Act, even within four year, if an assessee has furnished full and true particulars at the time of original assessment with reference to income alleged to have escaped assessment and whether and when in such cases reopening is valid or invalid on the ground of change of opinion?
(iii) Whether the bar or prohibition under the principle "change of opinion" will apply even when the Assessing Officer has not asked any question or query with respect to an entry/note, but there is evidence and material to show that the Assessing Officer had raised queries and questions on other aspects?
(iv) Whether and in what circumstances Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act can be applied and it can be held that it is a case of change of opinion?”
Therefore, the central issue examined in the decision of the Full Bench in Usha International Ltd. was as to what constituted a ‘change of opinion’. The Court, therefore, does not consider the decision in Orient Craft Ltd. as being contrary to the decision in Usha International Ltd. In other words, there is no occasion for the Court to refer to a larger bench the question of the correctness of the decision in Orient Craft Ltd. which decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case.”
Thus the Hon’ble High Court has held that in the absence of any new information for
taking recourse to provisions of section 147/148, the reopening of the assessment is
not valid. The Hon’ble Jurisdictional High court in case of CIT vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd.
393 ITR 264 has held in para 5 to 13 as under :-
“5. Indisputably, as per the provision of Section 147 of the Act, the Assessing Officer is empowered to initiate the re- assessment proceedings if any income of the assessee chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. But then, before initiating the re-assessment proceedings, the AO has to record the reasons in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 148, for formation of the belief that any income of the assessee chargeable to tax for the relevant assessment year has escaped assessment. As laid down by the Hon'ble
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Supreme Court, the belief entertained by the Assessing Officer must not be arbitrary or irrational, it must be reasonable and based on material on record. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer under the provisions of the Act pre-supposes due application of mind by the Assessing Officer on the material on record and formation of the belief by the Assessing Officer that the income has escaped assessment cannot be based on whims and fancy, there must exists rational and intelligible nexus between the reasons and the belief. 6. In the matter of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the ambit and scope of the provisions of Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax, 1922, which were similar to the provisions of Section 147 of the Act of 1961 explained the purports of Section 34, as under:— 'To confer jurisdiction under this section to issue notice in respect of assessments beyond the period of four years, but within a period of eight years, from the end of the relevant year two conditions have therefore to be satisfied. The first is that the Income-tax Officer must have reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have been under- assessed. The second is that he must have also reason to believe that such "under-assessment", has occurred by reason of either (i) omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22, or (ii) omission or failure on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Both these conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Income-tax Officer could have jurisdiction to issue a notice for the assessment or reassessment beyond the period of four years, but within the period of eight years, from the end of the year in question.' The Hon'ble Supreme court further observed that it is duty of every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. But, his duty does not extend beyond this. The Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that once all primary facts are before the Assessing Authority, he requires no further assistance by way of disclosure . It is for him to decide what inferences of facts can be reasonably drawn and what legal inferences have ultimately to be drawn. 7. In the matter of S. Narayanappa and Others v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore [1967] 63 ITR 219, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while relying upon the decision in the matter of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. (supra), has observed as under : 'But the legal position is that if there are in fact some reasonable grounds for the Income-tax Officer to believe that there had been any non-disclosure as regards any fact, which could have a material baring on the question of under- assessment, that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to issue the notice under section 34. Whether these grounds are adequate or not is not a matter for the court to investigate. In other words, the sufficiency of the grounds which induced the Income-tax Officer to act is not a
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justiciable issue. It is of course open for the assessee to contend that the Income-tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non- disclosure. In other words, the existence of the belief can be challenged by the assessee but not the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief. Again the expression "reason to believe" in section 34 does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The belief must be held in good faith: it cannot be merely a pretence. To put it differently, it is open to the court to examine whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. To this limited extent, the action of the Income-tax Officer in starting proceedings under section 34 of the Act is open to challenge in a court of law.' (Emphasis Supplied) 8. In the matter of ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das[1976] 103 ITR 437, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "Production before the Income-tax Officer of the account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence amount to disclosure contemplated by law. The duty of the assessee in any case does not extend beyond making a true and full disclosure of primary facts. Once he has done that his duty ends. It is for the Income-tax Officer to draw the correct inference from the primary facts. It is no responsibility of the assessee to advice the Income-tax Officer with regard to the inference which he should draw from the primary facts. If an Income-tax Officer draws an inference which appears subsequently to be erroneous, mere change of opinion with regard to that inference would not justify initiation of action for reopening assessment. The grounds or reasons which lead to the formation of the belief contemplated by section 147 (a) of the Act must have a material bearing on the question of escapement of income of the assessee from assessment because of his failure or omission to disclose fully and truly all material facts. Once there exist reasonable grounds for the Income-tax Officer to form the above belief, that would be sufficient to clothe him with jurisdiction to issue notice. Whether the grounds are adequate or not is not a matter for the court to investigate. The sufficiency of the grounds which induce the Income-tax Officer to act is, therefore, not a justiciable issue. It is, of course, open to the assessee to contend that the Income-tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non-disclosure. The existence of the belief can be challenged by the assessee but not the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief. The expression "reason to believe" does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income-tax Officer. The reason must be held in good faith. It cannot be merely a pretense. It is open to the court to examine whether the reasons for the formation of the belief have a rational connection with or a relevant bearing on the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant for the purpose of the section. To this limited extent, the action of the Income-tax Officer in starting proceedings in respect of income escaping assessment is open to challenge in a court of law." The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed :—
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"As stated earlier, the reasons for the formation of the belief must have a rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. Rational connection postulates that there must be a direct nexus or live link between the material coming to the notice of the Income -tax Officer and the formation of his belief that there has been escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment in the particular year because of his failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts." (Emphasis Supplied) 9. In the matter of Ganga Saran & Sons (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [1981] 130 ITR 1/6 Taxman 14 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:— "6. It is well settled as a result of several decisions of this Court that two distinct conditions must be satisfied before the Income Tax Officer can assume jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 147(a). First, he must have reason to believe that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment and secondly, he must have reason to believe that such escapement is by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. If either of these conditions is not fulfilled, the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer would be without jurisdiction. The important words under Section 147 (a) are "has reason to believe" and these words are stronger than the words " is satisfied". The belief entertained by the Income Tax Officer must not be arbitrary or irrational. It must be reasonable or in other words it must be based on reasons which are relevant and material. The court, of course, cannot investigate into the adequacy or sufficiency of the reasons which have weighed with the Income Tax Officer in coming to the belief, but the court can certainly examine whether the reasons are relevant and have a bearing on the matters in regard to which he is required to entertain the belief before he can issue notice under Section 147(a). If there is no rational and intelligible nexus between the reasons and the belief, so that, on such reasons, no one properly instructed on facts and law could reasonably entertain the belief, the conclusion would be inescapable that the Income Tax Officer could not have reason to believe that any such escapement was by reason of the assessee had escaped assessment and such escapement was by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and the notice issued by him would be liable to be struck down as invalid." (Emphasis Supplied) 10. In the matter of Sri Krishna (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [1996] 221 ITR 538/87 Taxman 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "The Income-tax Officer can issue notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act,1961, proposing to reopen an assessment only where he has reason to believe that on account of either the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to file the return or on account of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income has escaped assessment. The existence of the reason(s) to believe is intended to be a check, a limitation, upon his power to reopen the assessment. Section 148(2) imposes a further check upon the said power, viz., the requirement of recording of reasons for such reopening by the Income-tax Officer. Section 151 imposes yet another check upon the said power, viz., the Commissioner or the Board, as the case may be, has to be
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satisfied, on the basis of the reasons recorded by the Income-tax Officer, that it is a fit case for issuance of such a notice. The power conferred upon the Income-tax Officer by sections 147 and 148 is thus not an unbridled one. It is hedged in with several safeguards conceived in the interest of eliminating room for abuse of this power by the Assessing Officers. The idea was to save the assessees from harassment resulting from mechanical reopening of assessments but this protection avails only to those assessees who disclose all material facts truly and fully. Every disclosure is not and cannot be treated to be true and full disclosure. A disclosure may be a false one or a true one. It may be a full disclosure or it may not be. A partial disclosure may very often be a misleading one. What is required is a full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for making assessment for that year. All the requirements stipulated by section 147 must be given due and equal weight." It was further observed that : "Since the belief is that of the Income-tax Officer, the sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief is not for the court to judge but it is open to an assessee to establish that, in fact there existed no belief or that the belief was not at all a bona fide one or was based on vague, irrelevant and non-specific information. To that limited extent, the court may look into the conclusion arrived at by the Income-tax Officer and examine whether there was any material available on the record from which the requisite belief could be formed by the Income-tax Officer and further whether that material had any rational connection or a live link for the formation of the requisite belief." (Emphasis Supplied) 11. In the matter of CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. [2010] 320 ITR 561/187 Taxman 312 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words 'reason to believe', failing which section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen assessments on the basis of 'mere change of opinion', which cannot be per se reason to reopen. One must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to reassess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to reassess, but the reassessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain pre-conditions and if the concept of 'change of opinion' is removed as contended on behalf of the department, then in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of 'change of opinion' as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1-4-1989, the Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is 'tangible material' to come to conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, the Parliament not only deleted the words 'reason to believe', the Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word 'opinion' on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer." (Emphasis Supplied) 12. In the backdrop of the settled position of law noticed hereinabove adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be noticed that the assessee had made true and full disclosure of all relevant facts relating to the claim of additional depreciation and also
16 ITA No. 25/JP/2019 Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd., Jaipur.
in respect of claim for grant of deduction under Section 80 IA. A separate audit report in the prescribed form 10CCB in support of the claim for deduction under Section 80IA/80IB was also duly submitted. The assessee had also submitted reply pursuant to all queries made by AO during the assessment proceedings under Section 143(3) of the Act. In this view of the matter, the contention sought to be raised by the Revenue about non-disclosure on the basis of the failure on the part of the assessee in mentioned bifurcated amount of additional depreciation allowable in the depreciation chart is absolutely baseless. It is to be noticed that all that has been said by the AO is that after scrutiny assessment, it was observed that assessee has made incorrect claim of additional depreciation on CPP whereas, the claim for additional depreciation on CPP was allowed by the AO while framing the assessment under Section 143(3) after conscious consideration of the material on record. It is not even the case of the Revenue that the formation of the belief regarding the escapement of the assessment by the AO is based on any new material coming on record. Apparently, the formation of the belief by the AO regarding escapement of the assessment is based on re- appreciation of the material already available on record at the time of scrutiny assessment which amounts to mere change of opinion. Obviously, in the garb of purported exercise of the power to reassess, the AO cannot be permitted to review his own order or the order passed by his predecessor. Thus, the finding arrived at by the ITAT that the reassessment proceedings initiated by the AO by mere change of opinion is patently illegal, cannot be faulted with. 13. The ITAT having arrived at the categorical finding that re- opening of the completed assessment without any fresh material, merely on the basis of change of opinion of the AO, is without jurisdiction and erroneous, the appeal preferred by the Revenue has rightly been dismissed as having become infructuous.”
Therefore, reopening of the completed assessment without fresh material merely on
the basis of change of opinion on the material already available with the AO is
without jurisdiction and not sustainable in law. In view of the facts and
circumstances of the case as discussed above as well as following the decision cited
supra, we hold that the reopening of the completed assessment under section 147
on the basis of the facts and material already available with the AO at the time of
scrutiny assessment is not permissible under the law. Accordingly, we quash the
reopening of the assessment and consequential reassessment order passed by the
AO.
17 ITA No. 25/JP/2019 Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd., Jaipur.
Since we have quashed the reassessment on the validity of reopening,
therefore, we do not propose to adjudicate ground no. 2 of assessee’s appeal.
In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Order is pronounced in the open court on 03/07/2019.
Sd/- Sd/- ( jes'k lh- 'kekZ ) (fot; iky jkWo ½ (RAMESH C. SHARMA ) (VIJAY PAL RAO) ys[kk lnL;@Accountant Member U;kf;d lnL;@Judicial Member
Jaipur Dated:- 03/07/2019. Das/ आदेश की प्रतिलिपि अग्रेषित@ब्वचल वf जीम वतकमत वितूंतकमक जवरू
The Appellant- Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd., Jaipur. 2. The Respondent – The ACIT, Circle-6, Jaipur. 3. The CIT(A). 4. The CIT, 5. The DR, ITAT, Jaipur 6. Guard File (ITA No. 25/JP/2019) vkns'kkuqlkj@ By order,
सहायक पंजीकार@ Aेेपेजंदज. त्महपेजतंत